British Pre-war Attitudes
Gerard Oram
Executions in the British army should be understood in the context of ideas pertaining at the time. The very nature of military discipline was determined by social thought and ideas about punishments as much as it was by perceived military requirements.
First, the principle of deterrent was a major feature of English criminal law and Britain remained relatively untouched by the abolition movement that had made inroads into the law in most western countries.
Secondly, although the military liberally used field punishments, they were neither popular nor generally regarded as an effective deterrent when compared with capital punishment.
Third, Britain’s experiences in South Africa and concerns of degeneracy amongst the urban working-class recruits became heightened as the army expanded to cope with the exigencies of modern warfare.
And finally, the pre-war racial ideas of Britain influenced the disproportionately high incidence of condemnations and executions in the Irish units.
In the late nineteenth century, Britain appears to have stood out amongst Western countries in its retention of, and frequent recourse to, the death penalty. In Britain it was widely accepted that the death penalty was the most appropriate sentence for the crime of murder. This was reflected in an article in The Times in 1899, which suggested - perhaps over-enthusiastically - that ninety-nine per cent of 'moral' men supported the death penalty.
In many ways military punishments reflected attitudes already present in the criminal code. Capital punishment was less frequent than flogging, branding, or discharging soldiers in the military, but it was still inflicted with surprising regularity. The army executed thirty-seven men between 1865 and 1898 - a period punctuated by frequent colonial wars - and another four during the Boer War (1898 - 1902).
All this points to a system of military discipline firmly rooted in the principle of deterrence not unlike the continued reliance on the death penalty in the criminal code was thought to act as a deterrent to murder. The reforms of the late nineteenth-century abolished both flogging and branding, but left the death penalty in place.
Unlike other major European armies the British army was recruited on a voluntary basis. Paradoxically, this was a major factor in the comparative harshness of punishments. Volunteers for the army were regarded by many to have a lowly rather than an elevated status.
Army commanders were often doubtful about the loyalty of working-class recruits: colliers who had joined the Territorial Force were not issued with rifles or ammunition when so deployed. These doubts persisted well into the First World War, but so too did the unerring faith in the value of the death penalty as an effective weapon against indiscipline.
These two factors were undeniably a cause of conflict not only between the men and their commanders, but also within the army itself as it underwent a metamorphosis from a traditional 'volunteer' to a modern 'citizen' army.
The war in South Africa resulted in the biggest crisis the British Empire had faced and public confidence was severely dented. In 1899, the Inspector-General of Recruiting had reported that in Manchester three out of every five volunteers for the army had been rejected as physically unfit. The scandal quickly centred on 'the fitness of the race' question prompting the Director-General of the Army Medical Services to examine the evidence.
In 1903 he reported that there were signs of deterioration in physical fitness, especially amongst the urban working classes. Some army commanders were increasingly concerned about the quality of the men in their charge; a problem compounded by the lowering of standards in army medical examinations as the need for more recruits intensified during the First World War.
Regimental medical officers were encouraged to pass virtually everyone who presented themselves for examination. Apart from any other considerations 'the examiners were paid one shilling for every man they passed, and nothing for every man they rejected'. The death sentence was seen by a few as a means to reverse this process.
Irish troops had performed well in the Boer War and in 1900 a regiment of Irish Guards was formed in recognition. Yet there was a long-standing belief in Britain that the Irish were inferior. This was broadly based on two inter-related factors.
Firstly, the idea of English superiority - what can be termed Anglo-Saxonism - was highly influential. And secondly, anti-Catholicism in Britain was inseparable from anti-Irish attitudes.
Beliefs based on both factors were self-confirming to a large extent. Irish immigrants, often impoverished, were forced into the urban slums. The only employment opportunities normally open to these largely unskilled immigrants were the hardiest of manual labouring jobs.
The Irish soon acquired a reputation for 'uncontrollable violence', which was regarded by many contemporary observers as proof of the innate savagery of the Irish people and, therefore, by implication their inferior status to the English. This reputation amounted to one of moral degeneration, but also one of indiscipline. Consequently, it was generally accepted that Irish troops required particularly firm handling.
There were twenty-two executions of soldiers serving in Irish regiments between 1914 and 1918. Another three were executed in the following two years, making a total of twenty-five. This might not seem many, but given the size of the Irish regiments it is an extraordinarily high number.
For example, 112,223 men were recruited in New Zealand, slightly fewer than in Ireland, yet there were only five executions of soldiers serving with the New Zealand force - less than a quarter of the Irish total. Likewise, there were twenty-five executions in the Canadian Expeditionary Force - the same number as in Irish formations. Yet there were almost four times as many Canadians recruited than Irishmen.
It is clear from these figures that, given their actual numbers, more Irish troops were being executed than any others in the British army.
Furthermore, the disparity in Irish executions was not caused by a higher rate of confirmation, but by a greater frequency of condemnations by courts-martial.
Courts-martial represented the judicial (for which we must read 'disciplinary') will of the divisional commander, who was able to exert an enormous influence on the outcome. The confirmation of sentences, on the other hand, were the preserve of the Commander-in-Chief who was responsible firstly for the entire battle-front, but also for discipline on a much broader scale.
It is no surprise, therefore, to find that the rate of confirmations shows a remarkable degree of consistency. The Commander-in-Chief maintained a ratio of confirmations of approximately one in every ten cases referred to him. This was probably viewed as an acceptable level to maintain discipline through deterrent whilst not risking outraging public opinion either during or after the war when, as must have been obvious to those concerned, military statistics were published.
In most British formations, one in every 2-3,000 troops was sentenced to death. Yet one in fewer than every 600 Irishmen to enlist in the British army was sentenced to death by courts-martial. Interestingly, the number of condemnations in the ‘loyalist’ 36th (Ulster) Division is comparable to the other Irish divisions. This indicates that there was no religious basis for the disparity in Irish condemnations.
Differing battle experience is also an unsatisfactory explanation. The same disparity can be detected when comparing Irish units with other British units serving in the same divisions.
For example, Irish battalions served in the Guards Division and in the 4th, 7th, 8th and 29th Divisions. These were all regular divisions where death sentences were normally more common than in other types of division. But, most significantly, there were consistently more condemnations of troops serving with the Irish than in the other battalions.
On average seven death sentences were passed in every Irish battalion, but only four in other battalions in these divisions.
In an army that valued deterrent, and in particular the death penalty, as the most effective means of maintaining discipline it is no surprise that it was those troops whose discipline was widely believed to be wanting who were most vulnerable.
Dr Gerard C. Oram
Gerry Oram is a lecturer in history at the Faculty of Arts of The Open University in the United Kingdom. He has lectured on executions in the British Army during the First World War and has written various studies on the subject, including:
- Worthless Men. Race and Eugenics in the British Army 1914-1919 (1998)
- Military Law, 1868 – 1918. (1996)
- Death Sentences passed by Military Courts of the British Army 1914-1924 (1998)
This is a summary of an address given at the "Unquiet Graves" International Conference on Executions held in Flanders in May 2000.
